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By assuming Cobb-Douglas  production  technology, many well-known imperfectly 
competitive macroeconomic models of the labour market (e.g. Layard, Nickell and 
Jackman, 1991) imply that equilibrium unemployment is independent of the capital 
stock. This paper introduces a new notion of capacity into the standard framework. 
Specifically, we adapt the Cobb-Douglas production function so that when the capital-
labour ratio drops below a certain threshold, the returns to labour fall while the returns 
to capital increase. Using this assumption, we show that equilibrium unemployment 
depends on the capital stock  over a certain range. We also briefly  discuss the 
generalisation for an endogenous capital stock. 
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“It takes capital and entrepreneurship to create new firms and jobs.” 






Although it is intuitively obvious for some economists that employment and hence 
unemployment
2 should depend on investment and the level of the capital stock, many 
influential authors (e.g. Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991, henceforth LNJ) have 
argued theoretically that this is not the  case. As a result, unemployment is often 
viewed solely as a labour market phenomenon with the key debate centring on how 
best to reform labour markets in order to promote greater employment on the existing 
capital stock.  
 
However, the result that the equilibrium rate of unemployment (sometimes referred to 
as the NAIRU
3) is independent of the capital stock hinges on the assumption of Cobb-
Douglas production technology.  Rowthorn (1999) has shown that  assuming CES 
production instead of Cobb-Douglas production does break down this result. However, 
although the notion of “capacity” seems as if it should be fundamental to any analysis 
of the relationship between the capital stock and equilibrium unemployment, the CES 
production function lacks a clear notion of this concept. In addition, adopting CES 
production  implies that increasing the capital stock can reduce equilibrium 
unemployment regardless of how  much capital firms already have, a result which 
could be viewed as being slightly unrealistic. Meanwhile, for reasons explained below, 
in  (Cobb-Douglas)  putty-clay and putty-semiputty models which  do  introduce 
meaningful capacity constraints, changes in the capital stock are not normally able to 
                                                 
2 In this paper, we follow many authors in assuming that the employment and unemployment rates are 
related by the identity  1 ue ”-. Therefore, when we talk about one of the concepts, the reverse 
statement will always apply to the other concept. Note that this assumption implies that we are ignoring 
potential changes in inactivity.  
3 Throughout this paper, we will refer to the rate of unemployment that strips away cyclical fluctuations 
as the equilibrium rate of unemployment. We avoid the term NAIRU since its use in the literature is 
very confused: some authors make a great effort to theoretically distinguish the NAIRU and the natural 
rate of unemployment (NRU); other authors simply view the NAIRU as the empirical counterpart of the 
NRU; still others use the terms interchangeably. However, we should note that where the NAIRU is 
theoretically distinguished from the NRU (e.g. Carlin and Soskice, 1990), the NAIRU is usually defined 
in a similar way to our “equilibrium” rate of unemployment. 
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explain permanent changes in equilibrium unemployment (though they may be able to 
explain persistence in unemployment). 
 
In an attempt to offer a more convincing theoretical explanation of the relationship 
between the capital stock and equilibrium unemployment than currently exists, this 
paper therefore introduces a new production function in which the notion of capacity 
is meaningful. Specifically, we adapt the Cobb-Douglas production function so that 
when the capital-labour ratio drops below a certain threshold, the returns to labour fall 
discretely while the returns to capital increase discretely by the same amount. We 
introduce this type of capacity constraint into a standard imperfectly competitive 
macroeconomic model of unemployment of the type used by LNJ. Assuming that the 
capital stock is exogenous, we show that if the initial capital stock is within a certain 
range, increases in its level can permanently reduce equilibrium unemployment. We 
then illustrate how this result generalises for the case of an endogenous capital stock: 
in this case, equilibrium unemployment depends on the real user cost of capital over a 
certain range. In addition, we explain how our model may be adapted so that it is 
consistent with the stylised fact that the unemployment rate is untrended in the very 
long-run while the capital-labour ratio has grown steadily since the Industrial 
Revolution. The policy implications of our results are clear. Policies to promote 
investment may help to tackle unemployment. By contrast, the current focus on labour 
market reforms may be overstated. 
 
1.2 Motivation and Discussion of Related Literature 
 
1.2.1 The Prevailing Consensus on Unemployment 
 
Since the early 1970s, unemployment has risen substantially in most developed 
countries. Having said this, unemployment experiences have been diverse, especially 
over the past 10-15 years. In particular, there were several “success stories” in the 
1990s: the equilibrium rate of unemployment fell substantially in the United Kingdom, 
the Netherlands, Ireland, Portugal and Denmark. However, unemployment remains a 
major concern in a number of European countries.  
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Current thinking (e.g. LNJ; OECD, 1994; Siebert, 1997; Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel, 
2002) usually attributes unemployment to labour market inflexibility coupled with an 
inadequately skilled workforce. In recent years, much research on the topic has 
therefore focussed on which particular labour market institutions and rigidities are 
responsible for high levels of unemployment (see, for example, the discussions in 
Nickell, 1997 and Layard and Nickell, 1999).  A related research agenda (e.g. 
Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000) attempts to explain the evolution of unemployment 
across countries in terms of the interactions between shocks and institutions. The main 
argument here is that “flexible” institutions may allow economies to adapt more easily 
to adverse shocks. Proponents of both of these views often cite the United States as an 
example of a country where a “flexible” labour market has helped to keep the 
equilibrium unemployment rate at relatively low levels.  
 
The policy prescriptions for combating unemployment which follow from these lines 
of research are well-known. They include weakening the power of trade unions, 
cutting taxes on labour, deregulating labour markets (e.g. reducing employment 
protection; reducing firing restrictions), spending on active labour market policies (e.g. 
subsidising education and training opportunities for the unemployed), cutting the value 
and duration of unemployment benefits and reducing the relative value of minimum 
wages. Despite the fact that some of these policies potentially have adverse effects on 
other aspects of welfare, several countries have taken steps to reform their labour 
markets in these ways. The successes of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands in 
reducing unemployment are often attributed to their adoption of some of these 
policies.  
 
However, the evidence linking labour market reforms to lower equilibrium 
unemployment is controversial. In particular, Ball (1999) raises three issues. Firstly, 
he argues that the British and Dutch reforms were relatively minor and only moved 
these countries a very small way towards the highly “flexible” American labour 
market. More importantly, he argues that many countries, including Belgium, Canada 
and especially Spain, failed to reduce equilibrium unemployment significantly in spite 
of pursuing labour market reforms which were at least as large as (and perhaps even 
bigger than) the British and Dutch reforms. Finally, he argues that conventional 
explanations are unable to account for the successes of Portugal or Ireland since  
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neither of these countries experienced major changes in their labour market 
institutions.
4 The comparative success of Portugal in relation to Spain (which has the 
worst unemployment record in the OECD over the past twenty years) is particularly 
striking since, as Blanchard and Jimeno (1995) point out, the countries have 
remarkably similar labour market institutions.  
 
These arguments should not necessarily be viewed as suggesting that labour market 
reforms are totally unimportant in reducing unemployment. However, they do seem to 
imply that their importance may be somewhat overstated. In addition, they suggest 
that we may need to look elsewhere to explain at least part of the falls in equilibrium 
unemployment rates witnessed in the “success stories” of the 1990s. 
 
1.2.2 Unemployment and the Capital Stock 
 
In particular, it is a striking stylised fact that high levels of investment were prevalent 
in many of the “success stories” just before their equilibrium unemployment rates 
started to fall significantly.
5 For example, Portugal and Ireland both experienced 
investment booms: the former following accession to the European Economic 
Community in 1986; the latter driven by a very  large upswing in foreign direct 
investment during the mid-1990s. Meanwhile, to a lesser extent, it could be argued 
that the Netherlands benefited from increased investment in the early 1990s following 
German reunification. The historical experience of the United Kingdom economy is 
also interesting. As argued by Kitson and Michie (1996), the British investment record 
between the 1960s and the mid-1990s was dismal. Over this period, the country’s 
employment record was very poor. By contrast, the United Kingdom’s strong 
investment performance during the mid to late 1990s came at a time when equilibrium 
unemployment started to fall significantly. 
 
Although there are likely to be some common causal factors which simultaneously 
drive investment and employment growth, we should note that the reduction in 
                                                 
4 Glyn (2002) discusses the Irish experience in more detail and compares it to the experience of New 
Zealand, where the equilibrium unemployment rate hardly changed during the 1990s despite major 
labour market reforms. Based on the evidence from these two countries, he concludes (p. 16) that 
“Extensive labour market deregulation is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a radical 
improvement in employment”. 
5 It is also striking that at a broad cross-country level, equilibrium unemployment rose significantly 
following the worldwide post-1973 investment slowdown.  
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unemployment in all of these countries has been sustained long after investment rates 
have fallen. Therefore, despite the usual caveats relating to causation, these wide-
ranging experiences do suggest that above trend increases in the capital stock may 
have some effect in reducing equilibrium unemployment.  Moreover, although the 
collinearity issue means that empirical work in this area needs to be treated with some 
caution, the few formal studies that have been carried out are quite supportive of this 
assertion (e.g. Rowthorn, 1995; Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal, 2000; 
Miaouli, 2001; Alexiou and Pitelis, 2003). Despite this, promoting investment is rarely 
proposed as a policy to tackle unemployment. This seeming contradiction between 
theory and reality motivates our specific theoretical interest in the relationship 
between the capital stock and the equilibrium rate of unemployment.
6 However, before 
discussing our model, we briefly survey the contributions of other authors who have 
written on this topic. Broadly speaking, these contributions fall into two categories. 
 
1.2.2.1 Capital Scrapping Persistence 
 
A number of authors, including Malinvaud (1980), Soskice and Carlin (1989), Bean 
(1989, 1994) and Rowthorn  (1995), have discussed the potential impact of capacity 
utilisation on pricing decisions in order to show how falls in the capital stock may 
generate persistence in unemployment (though without affecting its long-run 
equilibrium rate). The key assumption of these models is that production technology is 
putty-clay or putty-semiputty so that ex-post, once capital has been installed, the 
elasticity of substitution between factors of production is low (or even zero). It is 
therefore argued that when capacity utilisation is high, firms are likely to increase their 
price mark-ups in order to choke off excess demand for their products and increase 
their profit margins. As a result, if an adverse shock erodes the capital stock, then 
when the shock is reversed, inflation will be generated at lower levels of output and 
higher levels of unemployment than were previously the case.  Therefore, 
unemployment can only return to its old level once any capital shortfall has been 
eliminated. Since it may take time for the capital stock to return to its old level, we can 
see how it might be possible for unemployment to remain persistently high for some 
time after a shock has been reversed.  
                                                 
6 As Hahn (1995, p. 52) comments: “One can only be amazed at the neglect of investment and of the 
capital stock in theories of the natural rate.”  
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However, it is important to note that in these models, the capital stock must always 
eventually return to its old level. This is because, in the long-run, once the limited 
factor substitutability constraint has been relaxed, firms will be able to choose their 
capital and labour inputs optimally. Since a shock which is subsequently reversed does 
not change anything fundamental which affects this choice, firms will choose their 
capital and labour inputs in the same way after a shock as they did before it. 
Therefore, we would always expect unemployment to return eventually to its old level 
in these models, meaning that they cannot explain changes in the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment in the long-run. 
 
1.2.2.2 Capital Accumulation and the Equilibrium Rate of Unemployment 
 
Less research has been done on the question of whether changes in the capital stock 
have direct and permanent effects on the equilibrium rate of unemployment. There are 
two main reasons for this.  
 
Firstly, Bean (1989), LNJ and others have argued that since the unemployment rate is 
untrended in the very long-run, it cannot be affected by trended variables such as the 
capital-labour ratio. However, this neglects the possibility that although trend 
increases in the capital-labour ratio may have no effect on the equilibrium 
unemployment rate, above trend or below trend increases could still have an impact. In 
other words, a one-off permanent step change in the absolute level of the capital-
labour ratio (i.e. relative to its long-run trend growth rate) could potentially 
permanently affect the equilibrium unemployment rate. So, there is nothing in this 
argument which rules out the possibility of a temporary investment boom permanently 
lowering the equilibrium unemployment rate. 
 
Secondly, it has been argued theoretically that the equilibrium rate of unemployment 
does not depend on the capital stock. This has been shown by LNJ (p. 107) in the 
competing claims imperfectly competitive macroeconomic model that has (at least in 
Europe) come to represent the canonical model of equilibrium unemployment. The 
intuitive explanation of this result is as follows. Increasing the capital stock has two 
direct effects: it generates employment on the extra capital stock and it increases real 
wages. However, the real wage increases have a secondary effect: they cause firms to  
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lower their demand for labour, thus reducing employment on the existing capital 
stock. If the elasticity of substitution is sufficiently high (specifically, if it is equal to 
one, meaning that production is Cobb-Douglas), then the lost employment on the 
existing capital stock will exactly cancel out the extra employment on the new capital 
stock, thus leaving overall employment unchanged. This description clearly illustrates 
how the LNJ result hinges on the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production function. 
The authors acknowledge this fact but then proceed to ignore it in the rest of their 
analysis, claiming that Cobb-Douglas production technology is “not a bad 
assumption” (p. 107). However, as we shall argue below, the implication of this 
assumption that the shares of capital and labour in output are constant may not be 
appropriate if the capital-labour ratio fluctuates. 
 
Since authors working in this area usually adopt a competing claims framework 
similar to that used by LNJ, we can therefore see how most of the existing literature 
has implicitly ignored any potential direct and permanent relationship between the 
capital stock and equilibrium unemployment. The one major exception is Rowthorn 
(1999). He argues that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is 
considerably less than one and therefore introduces a CES production function into the 
LNJ model. Based on this assumption, he shows that increasing the capital stock can 
theoretically reduce equilibrium unemployment. However, in his model, this 
conclusion holds regardless  of how much c apital firms already have. This seems 
somewhat unrealistic since we would probably  not expect investment to have much 
(or even any) impact on equilibrium unemployment if firms already have a very high 
capital stock.  Moreover, the CES production function does not really contain any 
notion of capacity and it therefore seems slightly odd to use it for the specific purpose 
of analysing the relationship between the capital stock and equilibrium unemployment. 
 
1.3 New Theoretical Perspectives 
 
Our model departs from the existing literature by adopting a new production function, 
which we will refer to as the capital constrained (KC) production function. This 
production function is simply a slightly more general version of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function. It essentially has the same functional form. However, in an 
attempt to offer a more convincing explanation of the relationship between the capital  
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stock and equilibrium unemployment than currently exists, it incorporates a new, 
meaningful notion of capacity. 
 
We introduce the KC production function  into a standard imperfectly competitive 
macroeconomic model of the type used by LNJ. The bulk of the paper is devoted to 
solving the model for the case where the capital stock is assumed to be exogenous. In 
this short-run analysis, we show that changes in the capital stock affect equilibrium 
unemployment over a certain range. This contrasts with the results of both LNJ and 
Rowthorn (1999).  In addition, by showing that an alternative assumption to CES 
production can generate the result that equilibrium unemployment depends on the 
capital stock, our results add further weight to the view of those economists who 
believe that promoting investment is important in tackling unemployment.  
 
We then consider the case of an endogenous capital stock, explaining intuitively how 
equilibrium employment depends negatively on the real user cost of capital (and hence 
on the real interest rate) over a certain range in this long-run analysis. (The formal 
justification for this result is contained in Chapter 4 of Kapadia, 2003.) That 
unemployment should be affected adversely by increases in the real interest rate is not 
a new idea. In particular, a number of potential causal links (of which the effect via 
capital accumulation is only one) have been discussed by Fitoussi and Phelps (1988) 
and Phelps (1994). However, in the existing theoretical literature, shifts in the real 
interest rate are not normally viewed as having a long-run impact on the equilibrium 
unemployment rate. For  example, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000, p. C6) ask 
themselves whether changes in the real interest rate are likely to have permanent 
effects on unemployment. They answer that “Theory is largely agnostic here…a 
plausible answer is that long run effects, if present, are likely to be small”. By contrast, 
our model provides a concrete theoretical explanation of why a change in the real 
interest rate can permanently affect the equilibrium rate of unemployment.  
 
Finally, we consider the evolution of the equilibrium (un)employment rate over time. 
In particular, we show that if we introduce labour-augmenting technical progress into 
our model, it is consistent with the stylised fact that the unemployment rate is 
untrended in the very long-run while the capital-labour ratio has grown steadily since 
the Industrial Revolution.  
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1.4 Structure of the Paper 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents and motivates 
the KC production function, introduces the other basic components of our model and 
describes the sequence in which decisions are made. Section 3 solves our model for 
the short-run case where the capital stock is assumed to be exogenous, while section 4 
briefly discusses the implications of endogenising the capital stock. Section 5  
considers the evolution of the equilibrium employment rate over time in our model. 
Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Introducing the Model 
 
The broad approach taken is to adopt an imperfectly competitive macroeconomic 
model of the type first used by Rowthorn (1977). The product market is characterised 
by monopolistic competition while wages are the outcome of a bargain between firms 
and trade unions. Perhaps the most well-known application of this type of model is 
contained in LNJ and the model presented below is essentially a development of their 
work. It also has close similarities to the models in Manning (1992) and, to a lesser 
extent, Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). 
 
2.1 The Basic Structure 
 
The economy is closed. We assume that it is composed of  F identical imperfectly 
competitive firms, all of which are assumed to maximise profits in the standard sense. 
In addition, we assume that all firms are small relative to the aggregate economy. As a 
result, these firms do not consider the effect of their individual actions on aggregate 
variables. Finally, in all of what follows, we treat the number of firms as fixed.   
 
2.1.1 The KC Production Function 
 
We assume that the output, Yi, of firm i is given by:  
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where: 
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and where Ni is employment, Ki is capital and Ai (which is assumed to be exogenous) 
captures the effects of other inputs and technological progress. Meanwhile, C  is a 
constant reflecting the threshold capital-labour ratio at which “full capacity” is 
reached. Since this threshold relates to the capital-labour ratio, the capacity constraint 
described is independent of the scale of the firm. Note also that from (2.1), it is clear 
that a must be greater than b (otherwise the returns to employment would be negative 
when  b was positive) but less than one (otherwise the returns to capital w ould be 
negative for b = 0). These restrictions rule out the possibility of increasing returns, a 
feature which Manning (1990, 1992) has shown may generate multiple equilibria. 
 
The above expressions characterise the capital constrained (KC) production function. 
This clearly differs from the standard Cobb-Douglas formulation which is used by 
LNJ. However, we can see that when b = 0 (i.e. when there is “spare capacity”), the 
KC production function reduces to the Cobb-Douglas case. Since the remaining parts 
of our model are standard, we can therefore see that  if there is always “spare 
capacity”, the result shown by LNJ (p. 107) that capital accumulation does not reduce 
equilibrium unemployment will also hold in our model. So, we can see that our model 
encompasses the standard framework. 
 
The interesting case occurs when the capital-labour ratio drops below the threshold 
capacity constraint at C (i.e. when the firm reaches “full capacity”) and b  increases 
discretely from zero to a constant positive value, causing the coefficients on capital 
and labour in the production function to change discretely. When this happens, it is  
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clear from  (2.1) that the returns to labour fall discretely while the returns to capital 
increase discretely by the same amount.
7 In other words, the share of labour in output 
(and hence the wage share) falls discretely while the share of capital in output (and 
hence the profit share) increases discretely.
8 However, there is no discrete change in 
the level of output (this follows from the fact that ( ) 1 ii KNC =  at the threshold).  
 
To further clarify what happens at the threshold, we sketch the KC  production 
function for a fixed capital stock in (yi, ni) space  in Figure 1. (Lower case letters 
denote logs of capital letters, as they will throughout this paper.) The magnitude of the 
slopes can be derived easily from (2.1). 
 
 
        ki - c               ni 
Figure 1 
 
This diagram clearly illustrates the difference between the Cobb-Douglas and KC 
production functions. In the former case, the production function is linear in log space; 
in the latter case, the production function is kinked at the threshold capacity constraint, 
with the reduction in its slope reflecting the discrete fall in the returns to labour at the 
threshold. 
                                                 
7 If it were the case that a = 1 (a = b), then crossing the threshold would entail moving from a situation 
resembling Leontief (Cobb-Douglas) production under “spare capacity” to Cobb-Douglas (Leontief) 
production under “full capacity”. In this scenario, we would only have diminishing returns to labour 
(capital) under “full capacity” (“spare capacity”). 
8 Note also that since labour productivity falls discretely at the threshold, it is clear that for a fixed 







b > 0 region 
 
Slope: a - b  
 
b = 0 region  
 
Slope: a   
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2.1.2 Motivating the KC Production Function 
 
The assumption of KC production is absolutely critical: it drives all of the new results 
in our model.  The key novel aspect of this production function is its notion of 
“capacity”. In the existing literature, the idea of “capacity” is often mentioned but the 
term is not usually precisely defined. However, it would seem plausible to suggest that 
“capacity” represents a region where diminishing returns to labour really kick in 
because workers do not have enough capital to work with. 
 
For example, suppose that we have a production process in which workers would 
ideally each have their own machine. Suppose also that the number of machines is 
fixed at five. Now, as the number of workers increases, there may be diminishing 
returns to labour for standard reasons. However, it seems likely that diminishing 
returns will be much more severe when we move from five to six workers than when 
we move from either four to five workers or from six to seven workers. This is 
because employment of the sixth worker is special in that it results in a switch from a 
situation where workers can each have their own machine to a situation where they 
must start to share machines. The fact that workers are forced to share machines also 
suggests that the returns to capital are likely to increase discretely at this point. 
 
Since the Cobb-Douglas production function is unable to capture these effects, it is 
unlikely to be appropriate if the capital-labour ratio fluctuates. By contrast, the KC 
production function can capture these effects. Specifically, the threshold can act as a 
metaphor for a region where diminishing returns to labour really kick in, because 
when the capital-labour ratio drops below a certain level and the threshold is crossed, 
the returns to labour fall sharply. Therefore, when analysing the effect of changes in 
the capital stock on equilibrium unemployment, the KC production function may be a 
superior alternative to the Cobb-Douglas production function and any conclusions 
derived using  it may be more realistic (note that since the KC production function 
nests the Cobb-Douglas production function, they can be no less realistic). Moreover, 
the KC production function is consistent with the stylised fact that during booms, 
when we would expect some firms to be capacity constrained, the share of labour in 
output falls. 
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2.1.3 The Remaining Components of the Model 
 
Having introduced the KC production function, we briefly describe the remaining 
components of our model. These are standard and closely follow Manning (1992). We 
assume that demand for the output of firm i is given by: 









￿￿ ￿￿ =￿￿ ￿￿
Łł Łł
X   (2.3) 
where Pi is the firm’s output price, P is the aggregate price level and D (P, X) is an 
index of aggregate demand facing the firm with  X being a vector of exogenous 
variables affecting this. This demand function is derived formally by Blanchard and 
Kiyotaki (1987, p. 664) using the assumptions (p. 649) that q is greater than one and 
that households have CES preferences. Note that q (which is technically the elasticity 
of substitution between goods in household utility) may be taken to represent the 
degree of product market competitiveness, with an infinite value of q corresponding to 
perfect competition. 
 










  (2.4) 
where  R is the real user cost of capital (assumed to be exogenous) and Wi is the 
nominal wage rate. Substituting (2.3) into (2.4) gives:   
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X
  (2.5) 
 
Each firm  has a corresponding (risk-neutral) trade union with which it bargains. We 















  (2.6) 
where V  is the alternative wage available to a worker who loses his job with the firm. 
This is treated as exogenous when we examine the partial equilibrium bargain between 
an individual firm and its union but is endogenised when we consider the general 
equilibrium solution. Meanwhile g (which is constrained to lie between zero and one) 
reflects the relative weighting of employment and relative real wages in the union’s  
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utility function. Equation  (2.6) is quite a general specification. It  covers both the 
utilitarian ( g  =  ½)  and seniority ( g =  0) models of Oswald (1982 and  1993 
respectively). 
 
Since the nominal wage in each firm is the outcome of a bargain between the firm and 
its union, we assume that it is chosen to maximise the Nash product: 









l - Øø ￿￿ Øø W=P-- ￿￿ Œœ ºß Łł ºß
  (2.7) 
or alternatively, using (2.6): 










- Øø ￿￿ W=-P+ Œœ ￿￿
Łł Œœ ºß
  (2.8) 
where l (which is constrained to lie between zero and one) represents the bargaining 
power of the union. If  l = 1, we are effectively just maximising union utility. By 
contrast, if l = 0, union utility plays no role and we will obtain the competitive 
outcome for the real wage.  This Nash  bargaining s olution can be derived as the 
subgame perfect equilibrium of a formal bargaining game (Binmore, Rubinstein and 
Wolinsky, 1986). Note that since the capital stock is already determined when the 
Nash bargain takes place (see the timeline below), the fallback level of profits for the 
firm if it does not reach agreement with the union is equal to –RKi. This relates to the 
notion of “bygones being bygones” when the bargain takes place. It explains why we 
use operating profits (i.e. gross of capital costs) rather than total profits in (2.7) and 
(2.8). Finally, note that by taking logs, we may rewrite (2.8) as: 







Øø ￿￿ W=+--+-P+ ￿￿ Œœ
Łł ºß
  (2.9) 
 
2.2 Timeline of Decisions 
 
We assume that decisions are made in the order depicted in the diagram below: 
 
Ki          Wi              Ni and Pi 
Period t-1        Start of Period t            End of Period t 
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This is a conventional sequence. The capital stock is determined in the period prior to 
the determination of wages, employment and prices. This is our justification for 
treating the capital stock as exogenous in our short-run analysis in section 3. Given the 
capital stock, the nominal wage is determined according to the Nash b argain 
(characterised by (2.9)) between the firm and the union at the start of period t. Finally, 
at the end of period t, the firm chooses employment and the output price to maximise 
its profits, taking both the capital stock and the nominal wage level as predetermined. 
 
3. Short-Run Analysis: Exogenous Capital Stock 
 
In this section, we solve our model for the case where the capital stock is exogenous. 
In other words, we only consider decisions made in period t. After giving a brief 
intuitive discussion of our main results, we concentrate on the partial equilibrium 
solution at the level of the individual firm. Our analysis discusses both  the end of 
period pricing and employment decisions (this entails deriving the firm’s labour 
demand curve)  and start of period  wage-setting.  We then consider the general 
equilibrium solution.  We show that over a certain range, aggregate equilibrium 
employment will depend on the level of the capital stock. 
 
3.1 Intuitive Discussion of the Main Results 
 
The nature of the KC production function means that it is effectively composed of two 
separate Cobb-Douglas “production functions”, each with different factor shares, with 
the relevant one depending on whether the capital-labour ratio is above or below the 
specified threshold. Therefore, when we solve the short-run model, we obtain a 
solution for aggregate employment corresponding to each “production function”.
9 (We 
also obtain a corner solution, the details of which are discussed in our formal 
analysis.) As in the analysis of LNJ, at each of these two solutions, employment does 
not depend on the capital stock. This is as we would expect from the Cobb-Douglas 
nature of each of our “production functions”. However, the key point is that  the 
solution at which the economy ends up will depend on the level of the exogenous 
capital stock, as t his determines the capital-labour ratio and hence the relevant 
                                                 
9 To see why this must be the case, consider what would happen if we treated our model as two separate 
models in isolation, with only the coefficients on capital and labour in the production function differing 
between them.  
  17 
“production function”. Moreover, aggregate employment is different in each of the 
two solutions. In particular, it is higher in the solution for which the capital-labour 
ratio is above the threshold (i.e. when the capital stock is high). This is because, in this 
solution, the share of labour in output (and hence the wage share) is higher. Therefore 
less unemployment is required to keep union wage demands in check. Alternatively, 
we could view the result as stemming from the fact that when the capital stock is high, 
the productivity of workers is high, meaning that workers are effectively “cheap” 
compared to the case where labour productivity is low. In other words, marginal costs 
are lower when the capital stock is high. As a result, firms will employ more workers 
in this case. Overall then, we can start to see how equilibrium employment will 
depend positively on the capital stock over a certain range in our model. However, it is 
clear that if the capital stock is already high, increases in its level will not have any 
impact on equilibrium employment.  
 
3.2 Partial Equilibrium Labour Demand Curve 
 
We start our formal analysis by deriving the firm’s labour demand curve for a given 
capital stock and nominal wage level (i.e. we start by considering the firm’s decision 
at the end of period t). To do this, we first eliminate the price term from (2.5) to enable 
us to maximise the profit function with respect to Ni. Substituting (2.1) into (2.3) and 
rearranging gives: 
  ( )
1
1








--+ Øø ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ Œœ = ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
Œœ Łł Łł Łł ºß
X
  (3.1) 
Since  (3.1) uniquely determines the firm’s output price for a given level of 
employment, we can see that by considering  the firm’s employment decision at the 
end of period  t (as we do below), we are implicitly taking into account their 
contemporaneous pricing decision. Substituting (3.1) into (2.5) and simplifying gives: 
  ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
1 1









----+- ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ P=-- ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
Łł Łł Łł
X
  (3.2) 
which may be rewritten as: 
  ( )
( ) ( ) 1 1
1 1'






q qqa q q
a qq
-
- -- ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ P=-- ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
Łł Łł Łł
X
  (3.3)  
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where: 





=   (3.4)
Note that the assumptions on the parameters (01 ba £<<  and  1 q > ) imply that 
0'1 a << . 
 
For both values of b, subject to the constraints of (2.2), the firm obviously wants to 
choose employment to maximise its real profits. In other words, the firm wants to 
choose Ni to maximise (3.3) for the cases b = 0 and b > 0 subject to the constraints 
( ) ii NKC £  and  ( ) ii NKC ‡  respectively.  
 
We proceed by solving these two constrained optimisation problems alongside each 
other using Kuhn-Tucker theory. If 
0
i P  corresponds to real profits given by (3.3) when 
b = 0, then using (2.2), we can see that the complementary slackness conditions for the 






















>=   (3.6) 
For the b > 0 problem, if  i
+ P  corresponds to real profits given by (3.3) when b > 0, the 


















<=   (3.8) 
 
We start by considering the corner solutions (3.6) and (3.8). Employment at both 







=   (3.9) 
Moreover, both corner solutions yield the same level of real profits to the firm. To see 
this, substitute (3.9) into (3.2) to get:  
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  ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 (1) 1






qabq q q q
qq
-- -




This simplifies to: 
  ( )
( ) ( )
1 (1)









-- ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ P=-- ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
Łł ŁłŁł Łł
X
  (3.10) 
which is independent of b. Since b is the only variable that differs between (3.6) and 
(3.8), we can see that, for a given wage, profits are the same at both corner solutions. 
Therefore, in terms of the key variables of interest, the two corner solutions are 
effectively the same, meaning that we do not need to consider them separately in what 
follows.  
 
We now consider the interior solutions (3.5) and (3.7), deriving the labour demand 
curves which we would get if we always had b = 0 or b > 0 respectively. As all of the 
firms are small relative to the aggregate economy, we assume that the aggregate price 
level, P, is fixed when firms maximise their profits (since X is a vector of exogenous 
variables, this implies that we can also treat  D (P, X) as fixed). Moreover, as our 
timeline shows, the nominal wage and capital stock are already determined when the 
firm makes its profit-maximising decision at the end of period t. Finally, recall that F, 
C and R are all fixed. Therefore, we can proceed by differentiating the profit function 
given by (3.3) with respect to Ni. The first order condition is: 
  ( )














- ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ = ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
Łł Łł Łł
X
  (3.11) 
Since (3.3) is concave in Ni (this follows from the fact that a ' < 1), this solution is a 
global maximum. Rearranging (3.11) to make Ni the subject, we get:   













q qqa q q
qq a
- -
- - -- Øø
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ Œœ = ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ Œœ Łł Łł Łł Œœ ºß
X
  (3.12) 
At interior solutions, (3.12) is the firm’s labour demand curve: it applies for both b = 0 
and b > 0 and gives the firm’s optimal employment choice for a given wage and 
capital stock. As noted above, it also determines the firm’s output price via (3.1). In 
Appendix A, we show that the firm’s real operating profits in terms of the wage at 
optimal (interior) solutions for employment are given by:  
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a qqqa q q a qq aa
- -
- --- Øø
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ Œœ P+=- ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ Œœ Łł Łł Łł Œœ ºß
X
  (3.13) 
 
We are now able to illustrate the firm’s overall labour demand curve by constructing a 
diagram (Figure 2) in (wi – p, ni) space. This consists of the firm’s labour demand 
curves for both b = 0 and b > 0 (sketched using the log version of  (3.12)) and an 
example threshold capacity constraint.  
 
 
           ki - c           (J)          ni 
Figure 2 
 
The justification for the relative slopes of the curves is contained in Appendix B. We 
also show in this appendix that the intersection of these two curves at (X) will always 
occur at a level of employment below the threshold capacity constraint. 
 
Given the fact that the threshold capacity constraint is to the right of (X), i t is 
immediately clear from Figure 2 that for any given wage and threshold, there is only a 
single applicable labour demand curve (with an invariant section at the threshold 
capacity constraint). F or wages between  w1 and  w2, neither interior solution is 
“feasible” (i.e. consistent with (2.2)). As a result, the corner solution (which coincides 
with the threshold capacity constraint) must be chosen in this wage range. By contrast, 
outside of this range, the interior solution on the applicable labour demand curve will 
wi - p 












b > 0 region  b = 0 region 
(X) 
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be chosen by the firm (the corner solution is clearly inferior, regardless of whether      
b = 0 or b > 0 at it). Specifically, if the wage is greater than w2, the interior solution 
corresponding to the b = 0 labour demand curve will be chosen, while if the wage is 
less than w1, the interior solution corresponding to the b > 0 labour demand curve will 
be chosen. Therefore the firm’s overall labour demand curve is IYZJ. 
 
Moving out of log form, we can summarise this section as follows. For a given wage, 
the firm’s overall labour demand curve is given by (3.12) with b = 0 for  ( ) ii NKC <  
(or equivalently  ( ) ( )2 ii WPWP > ) and by  (3.12) with  b > 0 for  ( ) ii NKC >  (or 
equivalently  ( ) ( )1 ii WPWP < ). Meanwhile,  for wages satisfying 
( ) ( ) ( ) 12 iii WPWPWP ££ , it is given by the corner solution (3.9):  ( ) ii NKC = . 
 
3.3 Partial Equilibrium Wage-Setting 
 
We now move on to discuss the decisions made at the previous stage in our timeline 
(i.e. at the start of period t). At this point, the firm and its union bargain over the 
nominal wage, taking the capital stock as given and assuming that they are too small 
to affect the aggregate price level. We assume that both parties are also fully aware of 
the employment and pricing decisions that the firm will make for a given wage at the 
end of period t and that this information is used when bargaining.  
 
In a crude sense, we may view the wage determination problem as requiring us to 
choose the nominal wage to maximise the Nash product given by  (2.8) (or, in log 
form,  (2.9)) subject to a “budget constraint” which, in this context, is  the labour 
demand curve derived in the previous  section. Since this labour demand curve is 
kinked, we need to consider the possibility of a corner solution at the threshold.  
 
Our approach involves initially searching for the wages that would be set for the b = 0 
and b > 0 labour demand curves in the absence of capacity constraints (i.e. without 
assumption (2.2)). We then determine the wage that will be set at the corner solution. 
These three solutions for the wage (one for each of the three curves that make up the 
overall labour demand curve) give us three potential solutions for end of period 
employment. We then check these employment outcomes for feasibility (i.e.  
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consistency with (2.2)). Once we have done this, the feasible solutions are compared 
to see which yields the highest value of the Nash product (2.8). The one that does best 
will be the one which is chosen.
10  
 
3.3.1 Interior Solutions 
 
We wish to choose Wi to maximise (2.9) for the interior solution labour demand curve. 
However, instead of differentiating with respect to Wi, we differentiate with respect to 
ln  Wi. Note that the chain rule implies that this will generate the same solution. 
Recalling our assumption that the alternative wage,  V , is exogenous in the partial 
equilibrium analysis, we can see that the first order condition is: 
  ( )
( )








Øø Øø - P+ ºß Œœ +-+-=
Œœ
ºß
  (3.14) 





y =   (3.15) 
where: 
  ( )









  (3.16) 
In other words, the wage is simply marked-up over the alternative wage by a factor of 
y. However, the value of y depends on a ' and therefore on  b. We also show in 
Appendix C that y depends positively on b. Therefore, if we let y 
0 correspond to the 
case b = 0 in (3.16) and y 
+ correspond to the case b > 0, then we have y 
+ > y 
0. In 
other words, if  the firm is operating under  “full capacity”, the mark-up is higher. 
Intuitively, we may explain this by noting that when b > 0 the employment gain from 
accepting a lower wage is less than the employment gain when b = 0. This is because 
the returns to labour are lower when b > 0 and so extra workers are not worth as much 
to the firm. 
 
                                                 
10 At first, this may seem like an unnecessarily lengthy approach. However, we are unable to solve the 
problem easily by considering the shape of a general indifference curve since the indifference curves, 
which could be derived by substituting (3.3) into (2.9) and differentiating, clearly depend on a ' and will 
therefore also be kinked at the threshold. As a result of this complexity, it is easier to consider each of 
the three solution possibilities separately and then compare them, which is what we do in the text.  
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It is immediately clear from (3.15) that apart from the potential discrete effect on the 
value of  b (via  (2.2)), the bargained real wage does not depend on employment. 
Therefore, if we sketch the wage-setting curve in ( wi  –  p,  ni) space, it will be a 
horizontal line with its intercept depending on whether b > 0 or b = 0 (and being 
higher when  b > 0). We add these curves onto Figure 2 and remove the example 
threshold capacity constraint  to get Figure 3  below. This is a partial equilibrium 




            i n
+
   
0
i n              ni 
Figure 3 
 
As is clear from the diagram, there are two equilibria: one corresponding to b = 0 (call 
this equilibrium (A)) and one corresponding to b > 0 (call this equilibrium (B)). (A) 
corresponds to a higher level of employment but a lower wage. In other words, if 
0
i N  
is the employment level at (A) (when b = 0) and  i N
+
 is the employment level at (B) 
(when b > 0), then we have 
0
ii NN
+ < . We can derive analytical expressions for 
0
i N  
and  i N
+
 by substituting  (3.15) into  (3.12)  and taking b = 0 or b > 0 as appropriate. 
This gives: 
  ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( )

















￿￿ - Œœ = ￿￿ Œœ Łł Œœ ºß
X
  (3.17) 
wi - p 
LD (b = 0)  LD (b > 0) 
(B) 
(A) 
WS (b > 0) 
WS (b = 0)  
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￿￿ ￿￿ Œœ = ￿￿ ￿￿ Œœ Łł Łł Œœ ºß
X
  (3.18) 
For b = 0 and b > 0 respectively, (3.17) and (3.18) are the interior solutions for period 
t employment. They also determine the firm’s output price via (3.1). However, we 
must bear in mind that  they might not be feasible due to the threshold capacity 
constraint. In addition, it may turn out that a corner solution does better than the 
interior solutions. It is to these issues that we now turn. 
 
3.3.2 Corner Solution 
 
The corner solution is given by (3.9). From the end of section 3.2, we know that the 
firm will only choose this solution at the end of period t if the real wage satisfies the 
constraint  ( ) ( ) ( ) 12 iii WPWPWP ££ . When choosing ln Wi to maximise (2.9) for 
the corner solution labour demand curve, this implies that the complementary 
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W ￿￿￿￿ >= ￿￿￿￿
ŁłŁł
  (3.21) 
 
We start by considering  (3.19).  In Appendix C, we show that the wage equation 
associated with the first order condition in this case is: 
 



















- ￿￿ ￿￿ -+- ￿￿ ￿￿
Łł ￿￿ Łł = ￿￿ - Łł
X
  (3.22) 
 
To see whether this solution satisfies the corresponding complementary slackness 
condition, we need to determine the values of  ( )1 i WP and  ( )2 i WP. From Figure 2, 
we can see that these are given by the real wage at the intersection of the threshold 
capacity constraint and the labour demand curves for b > 0 and b = 0 respectively.  
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Recalling the fact that a ' is defined by (3.4), the b > 0 (inverse) labour demand curve 
(3.11) may be written as: 
  ( )















- ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ = ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
Łł Łł Łł
X
  (3.23) 
Substituting (3.9) into (3.23) and simplifying gives ( )1 i WP: 
  ( )














- - - ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ = ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
Łł Łł Łł
X
  (3.24) 
The b = 0 (inverse) labour demand curve follows from substituting b = 0 into (3.23): 
  ( ) ( )













- Øø￿￿ - ￿￿ = ￿￿ Œœ ￿￿
Łł ºßŁł
X
  (3.25) 
Substituting (3.9) into (3.25) and simplifying gives ( )2 i WP: 
  ( ) ( )













- - - Øø￿￿ - ￿￿ ￿￿ = ￿￿ Œœ ￿￿ ￿￿
Łł ŁłºßŁł
X
  (3.26) 
 
Comparisons between (3.22), (3.24) and (3.26) can now be made to see whether the 
complementary slackness condition in (3.19) is satisfied. If it is, the real wage will be 
given by  (3.22); if not, it will be given by (3.24) (if (3.20) is satisfied) or (3.26) (if 
(3.21) is satisfied). Comparing  (3.22) and  (3.26), we can see that since 
( ) ( ) 110 V llg Øø --> ºß , we will have ( ) ( )2 ii WPWP >  (thus violating (3.19)) if: 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )

































Cancelling terms (which are all positive) and then rearranging gives: 
  ( )









  (3.27) 
Therefore, if condition (3.27) is satisfied, (3.19) will be violated but (3.21) will be 
satisfied and the corner solution real wage will be given by (3.26) (meaning that the 
overall equilibrium will be at the intersection of the threshold and the b = 0 labour 
demand curve). We can see that  (3.27) will be satisfied if the union’s bargaining 
power (l) is sufficiently high (this is as we would expect: increasing wages for a fixed  
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employment level reduces profits
11 and is therefore bad for the firm but good for the 
union). It is also more likely to be satisfied if g is low (i.e. if the union attaches a 
relatively low weight to employment in its utility function). 
 
In what follows, we are going to assume that (3.27) is always satisfied. This may be 
justified on the grounds that the whole imperfectly competitive approach to the 
determination  of unemployment is only interesting if the union has a reasonable 
amount of bargaining power (i.e. l is significantly greater than zero) and cares to a 
certain degree about relative real wages (i.e. g is significantly less than one). (As noted 
in  section 2 , if the  union  had no bargaining power or if  it only cared about 
employment, we would obtain the perfectly competitive outcome for the real wage.) 
We also make this assumption because it illustrates all of the points which we wish to 
make and simplifies the analysis. Although we could consider the other cases, we 
would not gain any further  major insights: the details would be different but the 
overall conclusion about equilibrium employment depending on the capital stock over 
some range would be unaffected. 
  
3.3.3 Checking for Feasibility and Comparing Solutions 
 
We are now able to check all of our solutions for feasibility and then compare the 
feasible solutions to see which one yields the highest value of the Nash product (2.8) 
(or, in log form, (2.9)) and will therefore be chosen. There are three potential solutions 
to consider. These are the corner solution just discussed and the two interior solutions 
discussed in section 3.3.1: (A), for which b = 0, employment is 
0
i N  and the real wage 
is 
0V y ; and (B), for which b > 0, employment is  i N
+
 and the real wage is  V y
+ . 
Although the corner solution is always feasible (this almost follows by definition - 
since it coincides with the threshold capacity constraint, it cannot violate (2.2)), the 
interior solutions might not be feasible. 
 
In fact, we can immediately show that it is impossible for both (A) and (B) to be 
feasible at the same time. To see this, suppose that (B) is feasible. As b > 0 at (B), it is 
clear from (2.2) that this requires  ( ) ii NKC
+ > . Since we know that employment is 
                                                 
11 Assuming that output remains constant (i.e. there are no efficiency wage effects).  
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higher at (A) than at (B), this implies that  ( )
0
ii NKC > . But, since b = 0 at (A), this is 
not consistent with (A) being feasible. Hence the result follows. 
 
However, which (if either) of the interior solutions is feasible will depend on the 
threshold employment level at which b becomes positive. Recalling the fact that C is 
fixed, we can see from (2.2) that this depends directly on the level of the (exogenous) 
capital stock. Therefore, we now vary the capital stock in order to check for feasibility 
in different scenarios. We have three cases to consider (the type of line used in Figure 
4 below is described in brackets):  
(i)  “Spare Capacity” (dots) 
 







+ =<<   (3.28) 
(ii)  “Moderately” Capacity Constrained (long dashes) 
 
0







+ =<<   (3.29) 
(iii)  “Severely” Capacity Constrained (dots and dashes) 
 
0







+ =<<  (3.30) 
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Figure 4 
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(iii)  (i)  (ii)  
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The log forms of example thresholds representing each of these three cases are added 
onto a simplified version of Figure 3 to give Figure 4.
12 
 
As before, the interior solutions are at (A) and (B).  The c orner solution varies 
according to the threshold. Provided condition (3.27) is satisfied, we know from the 
previous subsection that the corner solution will be at the intersection of the threshold 
capacity constraint line and the b = 0 labour demand curve. Therefore, in terms of 
Figure 4, it will be at (G) in case (i), at (C) in case (ii) and at (E) in case (iii). 
 
We start by discussing case (ii) since it is the easiest one to consider. Since b = 0 at 
levels of employment lower than the threshold (i.e. to the left of the threshold) and 
since b > 0 at levels of employment higher than the threshold, the overall labour 
demand “constraint” is given by ICDJ. In this scenario, it is clear both from Figure 4 
and from  (2.2) that neither (A) nor (B) is feasible. The only feasible solution is the 
corner solution at (C). Therefore this will be chosen, meaning that employment will be 
given by 
M
ii NKC = . 
 
In case (i), the overall labour demand curve is IGHJ. As a result (A) is feasible but (B) 
is infeasible.  Therefore, we must compare (A) with some arbitrary corner solution 
represented by (G) to see which yields a higher value of the Nash product (2.8). Using 
a revealed preference argument, it is immediately  clear that (A) will be preferred. 
Since (A) and (G) are both on the b = 0 labour demand curve, wages generating both 
of these solutions  could have been chosen when we solved the  b = 0 wage 
determination problem ( recall that this problem maximised the Nash product). 
However, since the wage corresponding to (A) (i.e. 
0V y ) was chosen then, it will 
continue to be chosen in this scenario at the start of period t. As a result, the firm will 
choose a level of employment equal to 
0
i N  at the end of period t. 
 
Finally, in case (iii), the overall labour demand curve is IEFJ, meaning that (B) is now 
feasible but (A) is infeasible. Therefore, this time, we must compare (B) with some 
                                                 
12 S ince the level of the capital stock affects the position of the labour demand curves, we should 
technically draw three different diagrams to represent the three different cases. However, since we are 
only ever considering one of the thresholds at any given time in the analysis below, we can abstract 
from this point and do so in order to illustrate the differences between the cases more clearly.  
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arbitrary corner solution represented by (E). Unfortunately, it is not as easy to make 
comparisons in this case as (E) was not available when (B) was chosen in the b > 0 
wage determination problem. Indeed, we are unable to compare the two solutions 
analytically (this is because of the  ( ) ln i WPV Øø - ºß  term in  (2.9) which creates 
problems). However, we can still make two points (since these are all we need for our 
main results, an analytical comparison would not add much). 
 
Firstly, we can say that the maximum level of employment in case (iii) is  i N
+
 (i.e. the 
low equilibrium  employment level corresponding to (B)). This is because if 
employment at the (arbitrary) corner solution  (E) were greater than this, then the 
threshold would be to the right of (B) and we would be in case (ii).  
 
Secondly, as shown in Appendix D, the outcome of the choice between  the interior 
solution  (B) and the (arbitrary) corner solution  (E) is ambiguous:  in terms of the Nash 
product, sometimes we will have: 
  ( ) ( ) ii BENN
+ ￿= f   (3.31) 
and sometimes we will have: 







￿= f   (3.32) 
The actual outcome will depend on both the level of the (exogenous) capital stock 
(through its impact on the position of the threshold) and the parameter values.  
 
By continuity, this result implies that for given parameters, there will be a particular 
level of the capital stock in case (iii) for which (B) and some arbitrary corner solution 
represented by (E) are indifferent. Let us define this particular level of the capital 
stock as 
1
i K  (or 
1
i k  in log form). By continuity with respect to case (ii), it is clear that 
levels of the capital stock just above 
1
i K  will lead to the arbitrary corner solution (E) 
being chosen while levels of the capital stock just below 
1
i K  will lead to (B) being 
chosen. 
 
We can now describe what happens as the (exogenous) capital stock falls in the 
vicinity of 
1
i K . When the capital stock is just greater than 
1
i K , the solution will be at  
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an arbitrary corner solution like (E) and the corresponding employment level is less 
than  i N
+
 (which  can be obtained at (B)).  As the capital stock falls below  
1
i K , the 
solution switches to (B) and employment therefore increases discretely. (Note that this 
implies that the minimum level of employment in case (iii) is 
1
i KC .)  
 
This rise in employment for a fall in the capital stock in the vicinity of 
1
i K  seems quite 
surprising at first, especially since everywhere else in the short-run model, a rising 
capital stock either increases employment or leaves it unchanged.  The result is 
essentially driven by the simplifying assumption of a two-regime model which results 
in switching at a specific point. Intuitively, we may explain what happens as follows. 
The assumption that condition (3.27) holds effectively means that we are assuming 
that the union is in a relatively strong position when bargaining. As a result, the 
bargainers (i.e. the union and the firm) generally prefer to be on the b = 0 labour 
demand curve rather than the b > 0 labour demand curve if possible. This is because 
the returns to labour and hence the overall wage share are greater when b = 0 than 
when b > 0. (The fact that the profit share is lower when b = 0 than when b > 0 is not 
weighted too heavily during bargaining because of the relative weakness of the firm.) 
Therefore, as the threshold moves to the left within case (iii)'' (due to falls in the 
exogenous capital stock), the bargainers try to maintain the value of  b at zero even 
though they must sacrifice some employment just to achieve this. Initially, they are 
happy to do this since the cost is small but the gain is relatively large. However, as the 
capital stock falls and the threshold continues to move to the left, the cost in terms of lost 
employment increases rapidly. Eventually, when the capital stock reaches 
1
i K , the costs 
become so great that the bargainers give up on their attempts to keep b equal to zero and 
accept the fact that it will take a positive value. This causes a discrete fall in the wage 
share (and the wage level) but results in a discrete increase in employment because the 
threshold constraint is released. 
 
3.3.4 Summary of the Partial Equilibrium Solution 
 
Provided that condition (3.27) is satisfied, if there is “spare capacity”, a wage of 
0V y  
will be set at the start of period t and, as a result, employment will be 
0
i N . Meanwhile,  
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if the firm is “severely” capacity constrained, the maximum level of employment will 
be  i N
+
, which we know  is less than  
0
i N , and the minimum level of employment will 
be 
1
i KC . Finally, if the firm is “moderately” capacity constrained, we will be at the 
corner solution and employment will be  i KC , which depends directly on the level of 
the exogenous capital stock. Overall then, we have a partial equilibrium range of 
employment between 
1
i KC  and 
0
i N  in this short-run model. The exact employment 
outcome within this range will depend on the level of the exogenous capital stock. 
Moreover, we can see that, with a minor exception in the vicinity of 
1
i K , increases in 
the capital stock increase employment over this range. 
 
3.4 General Equilibrium Solution 
 
We now analyse our model in a general equilibrium context. In aggregate, since all 
firms are identical, we have: 




======   (3.33) 
where the absence of a subscript denotes an economy-wide variable.  
 
3.4.1 Labour Demand Curve 
 
We start by using the relationships in (3.33) to derive the aggregate labour demand 





=   (3.34) 
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  (3.36)  
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This is identical to equation (14) on page 105 of LNJ.
13 So, if b always equals zero in 
our model (i.e. there is always “spare capacity”), then we are back to standard theory 




We now consider wage-setting - this will enable us to derive expressions for aggregate 
employment and unemployment in the (short-run) model. Here, the key difference 
between the partial and general equilibrium cases is that in the general equilibrium 
case, we can no longer treat the alternative wage, V , as exogenous. Instead, following 








  (3.37) 





=   (3.38) 







  (3.39) 
is the probability of being unemployed and receiving the nominal unemployment 
benefit, B. Note that by our definition, we have assumed that the employment rate, e, 
and the unemployment rate, u, are related by the identity  1 ue ”-. 
 
At the interior solutions, the partial equilibrium wage is given by (3.15). Substituting 






￿￿ - ￿￿ = ￿￿ ￿￿ - Łł Łł
  (3.40) 
Following LNJ (p. 107), we assume that the government indexes benefits to wages so 
that the benefit replacement ratio 
  ( )
( )




==<<   (3.41) 
                                                 
13 Their W denotes the real wage while ours denotes the nominal wage; their k  is elsewhere defined by 
( ) 1/ kqq =-   
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is fixed.  Aggregate e quilibrium employment at the interior solutions then follows 
directly from (3.40) and (3.41): 



















  (3.42) 
Since aggregate employment cannot be negative, (3.42) is only valid if  1 by < . If this 
condition is violated, then N = 0. Intuitively, this means that if both the mark-up and 
the benefit replacement ratio are very high, then, as we might expect, we will have no 
employment. 
 
Substituting  (3.42) into  (3.35), we can derive an expression for the aggregate real 
wage at the interior solutions: 
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  (3.43) 
We can also use (3.38), (3.39) and  (3.42) to derive expressions for  the aggregate 
employment and unemployment rates: 
 
1











  (3.44) 
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  (3.45) 
 
Obviously all of these expressions depend on the value of y. Returning to (3.42), we 
can see that: 
  ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
2 2 2
111










  (3.46) 
As shown in Appendix C, y depends positively on b. Therefore, it follows from (3.46) 
that if b takes a constant positive value, aggregate equilibrium employment will be 
lower than if b = 0. So, a rise in b (which could be induced by a fall in the exogenous 
capital stock) will lead to a fall in aggregate equilibrium employment. In other words, 
if, as defined above,  we  let  y 
0 correspond to the case  b = 0 in  (3.16) and  y 
+ 
correspond to the case b > 0, then from (3.42):  
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with 
0 NN
+ > . 
 
As in the analysis of LNJ, it is clear from these expressions that aggregate equilibrium 
employment is independent of the level of the capital stock within each regime. 
However, its actual level does depend on the capital stock since this determines the 
regime which applies. Specifically, if the (exogenous) capital stock is sufficiently high 
(i.e. condition (3.28) is satisfied), the partial equilibrium solution will be at (A) and 
aggregate employment will be N
0. By contrast, if the capital stock is very low (i.e. 
condition (3.30) is satisfied), then we know from our discussion above that the partial 
equilibrium solution will either be at (B) or at the arbitrary corner solution (E) and the 
maximum level of aggregate employment will be N
+, which  is lower than N
0. (More 
specifically, if 
1 KK < , then employment will definitely be N
+.) Therefore, over a 
certain range, increases in the (exogenous) capital stock may lower aggregate 
equilibrium unemployment and we have broken down the LNJ result (p. 107) that 
“unemployment…is independent of capital accumulation”. This follows solely from 
using the alternative KC production function presented above: indeed it is interesting 
to note how sensitive the LNJ result is to such a small change of assumption. 
 
We may illustrate our result even more starkly by considering the corner solution. In 
this case, assuming that condition (3.27) holds, the partial equilibrium wage is given 
by (3.26): 
  ( )
1 (1)
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  (3.26) 
If this wage is set in all firms, then all firms will choose the corner solution for 
employment given by (3.9). However, since (3.26) is independent of the alternative 
wage,  V , the employment choices of individual firms will have no bearing on the 
aggregate real wage. As a result, the aggregate real wage at the corner solution will 
simply be given by the aggregate version of (3.26): 
  ( )
1 1(1)
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X
  (3.47)  
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Meanwhile, economy-wide employment will be given by aggregating  (3.9) which 
gives (3.34):  NKC = . Therefore, we can see that in this case, aggregate equilibrium 
employment depends directly and continuously on the (exogenous) capital stock. In 
Appendix E, we eliminate D (P, X) from (3.47) to derive an expression for the corner 
solution aggregate real wage solely in terms of the exogenous variables and 
parameters: 
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  (3.48) 
 
3.4.3 Summary of the General Equilibrium Solution 
 
Letting 
1 K  be the aggregate version of 
1
i K  (the point at which (B) and the arbitrary 
corner solution  (E) are indifferent and where regime-switching occurs), we may 












1    where   
1

















￿￿ - ￿￿ << ￿￿ = ￿￿ - ￿￿ ￿￿
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  (3.49) 
From this, we can see that the summary at the end of the partial equilibrium section 
continues to apply in the general equilibrium case. In particular, in equilibrium, 
aggregate employment may lie anywhere in the range 
10 , KCN Øø ºß . The exact 
employment outcome within this range (and hence the equilibrium employment and 
unemployment rates) will depend on the level of the (exogenous) aggregate capital 
stock.  If the capital stock is high, employment is likely to be high; if it is low, 
employment is likely to be low. However, outside of the range 
10 , KNC Øø ºß , changes in 
the capital stock will not affect employment. In particular, if the initial capital stock is 
fairly high, increases in its level will not be able to increase employment. This 
contrasts with the results derived by both L NJ using Cobb-Douglas production 
technology and Rowthorn (1999) using CES production technology.   
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4. Endogenising the Capital Stock 
 
The results presented above were derived under the assumption that the capital stock 
was exogenous. It is clearly interesting to consider how endogenising the capital stock 
might affect these short-run results. In chapter 4 of Kapadia (2003), we show that even 
in the long-run solution of our model, there is no guarantee that aggregate employment 
will always be at the high equilibrium level. Instead, with the capital stock 
endogenous, employment will be affected by the real user cost of capital (and hence 
by the real interest rate) over a certain range. 
 
Since the derivation of these results is quite long and since the results do not really 
change the essence of our short-run conclusions in any case, we do not present the 
formal argument here. However, the intuition behind the results is fairly easy to see. If 
the real user cost of capital is relatively high, it is clear that the firm will choose a low 
capital stock, meaning that the capital-labour ratio will be below its threshold and the 
low equilibrium employment outcome (which is associated with the low wage share 
and high profit share) will result. It is not quite so obvious that the firm will choose a 
high capital stock (which generates the high employment equilibrium) if the real user 
cost of capital  is low. This is because, if it does this, the capital-labour ratio will be 
above its threshold, meaning that the profit share will take its lower value. 
Nevertheless, if the real user cost of capital is sufficiently low, it is clear that the firm 
will indeed choose a high capital stock. This is because the direct loss from 
deliberately choosing a lower capital stock just to maintain a high profit share must 
eventually outweigh any potential gain. To see this, consider what happens in the limit 
as the real u ser cost of capital approaches zero. In this scenario, the firm can earn 
infinite profits by choosing an infinite capital stock. It is clearly not going to choose a 
finite capital stock just to increase its profit share. 
 
From all of this, we can therefore see how if the capital stock is endogenous in our 
model, equilibrium employment (and hence unemployment) will depend on the real 
user cost of capital (and therefore on the real interest rate) over a certain range. 
Specifically, if the real interest rate is high, equilibrium unemployment is likely to be 
high. By contrast, if the real interest rate is low, equilibrium unemployment is likely to  
  37 
be low.
14 Moreover, if investment (and hence the aggregate capital stock) is affected 
by factors other than the real user cost of capital (e.g. by taxes, the level of current and 
expected future profitability, the level of demand, corporate governance structure, or 
the ease of access to credit), then these factors will also have an impact on long-run 
equilibrium unemployment. The policy implications of all this are fairly obvious and 
will be discussed in our conclusion. 
 
5. The Equilibrium Employment Rate Over Time 
 
In this section, we consider the evolution of the equilibrium employment rate over 
time in our model. In particular, we adapt an argument developed by Rowthorn (1999, 
pp. 421-423) to show how our model can be made consistent with the stylised fact, 
mentioned by many authors (e.g. Bean (1989); LNJ), that the (un)employment rate is 
untrended in the very long-run while the capital-labour ratio has grown steadily since 
the Industrial Revolution.  
 
As our model currently stands, there is no mechanism which generates a constantly 
growing capital-labour ratio over time. Moreover, we cannot simply postulate that the 
capital-labour ratio grows at some exogenous rate, since the model would then imply 
that the economy would always eventually end up with a sufficiently  high  capital-
labour ratio to ensure that the high aggregate equilibrium employment rate results. 
 
However, suppose that all technical progress is labour-augmenting. (Our results would 
not be affected if we used the weaker assumption that technical progress has a labour-
augmenting bias – see Rowthorn (1999)). In this case, to maintain the status quo of our 
model (i.e. to keep the relative threshold unchanged), the capital-labour ratio must 
grow at the same rate as labour productivity.  Intuitively, this is because if labour 
productivity increases, each unit of labour “requires” a greater level of capital to work 
on for the returns to labour not to fall.  
 
To see this more formally, let us adapt the threshold capacity constraint (2.2) to be: 
                                                 
14 Note that changes in the real interest rate may partially be driven by changes in both output and 
inflation volatility. This then raises the interesting point that changes in volatility could potentially 
affect equilibrium unemployment. In other words, the long-run steady state could be influenced by the 
degree of short-term volatility, thus breaking down the dichotomy between the short-run and the long-
run which is sometimes assumed in macroeconomic models.  
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0  for    ("full capacity")

















  (5.1) 
where LN is an index of the productive efficiency of labour (assumed to be the same 
across all firms). Labour-augmenting technical progress is indicated by an increase in 
LN. The rate of growth of LN is assumed to be exogenous. 
 










  (5.2) 
It is clear that if  LN and  ( ) ii KN grow at the same rate, then the model we have 
developed will apply in every time period (i.e. the status quo of our model will always 
apply). By contrast, if ( ) ii KN grows more slowly than LN, then the threshold will be 
hit at lower and lower levels of employment as time progresses and it will become 
increasingly hard to sustain the high aggregate equilibrium employment rate. 
  
Now suppose that it is indeed the case that LN and  ( ) ii KN grow at the same rate on 
the trend equilibrium path. This assumption has been justified by Rowthorn (1999), 
but may also be justified by appealing to the Solow growth model (consider what 
happens on the balanced growth path). In this case, only above trend or below trend 
increases in the capital-labour ratio can affect the equilibrium rate of  employment, 
with above trend increases having a positive impact and below trend increases having 
a negative impact. Therefore, our model is able to simultaneously g enerate a 
constantly growing capital-labour ratio and an untrended (un)employment rate. 
 
Moreover, any policy change which results in a shift in the real user cost of capital, R, 
will affect the absolute level of the capital-labour ratio and will therefore  (over a 
certain range) have a one-off (i.e. level) effect on employment. However, it will have 
no effect on the long-run growth rate of  the capital-labour ratio since this is 
determined by the rate of growth of LN. Therefore, we can see that in our model, it is 
really the real user cost of capital (and hence the real interest rate) which determines 
the equilibrium employment rate (though the channel is through a one-off change in  
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the level of the capital stock). Since the real interest rate is untrended over time, our 
model therefore does not succumb to the argument of Bean (1989), LNJ and others 
that the (un)employment rate cannot be related to trended variables in the very long-
run. Finally, we should also note that the other determinants of investment, which we 
cited above as potentially being able to affect the equilibrium unemployment rate, are 




6.1 Summary of the Paper and its Main Results 
 
The main objective of this  paper was to theoretically investigate the relationship 
between the capital stock and the equilibrium rate of unemployment. Our approach 
involved using a new production function, referred to as the KC production function. 
This was designed to incorporate meaningful capacity effects not captured by either 
the Cobb-Douglas or CES production functions. We introduced the KC production 
function into an otherwise standard imperfectly competitive macroeconomic model of 
unemployment.  Solving our short-run model, we showed that equilibrium 
unemployment depends on the level of the capital stock over a certain range. We also 
explained intuitively how endogenising the capital stock in our model implies that it is 
the real user cost of capital which affects equilibrium unemployment instead. Finally, 
we showed how our model could be adapted to make it consistent with the stylised 
fact that the unemployment rate is untrended in the very long-run while the capital-
labour ratio has grown steadily since the Industrial Revolution.  
 
6.2 Possible Extensions 
 
In this paper, we assumed that all firms were identical. However, with heterogeneous 
firms, it is possible for some firms to be operating under “spare capacity” while other 
firms are operating under “full capacity”. Considering the implications of this  on 
aggregate outcomes could be a possible extension. However, intuitively it does not 
seem that our broad conclusions would be affected: even with heterogeneous firms, 
provided that the real user cost of capital were sufficiently low (high), we would still  
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expect most firms to be operating under “spare capacity” (“full capacity”), thus 
continuing to generate the high (low) aggregate equilibrium employment rate. 
 
We also  only searched for the equilibrium solutions for employment and other 
variables. Developing the model in a dynamic context to consider what might happen 
during the transition to equilibrium following a shock is clearly another possible 
extension.  
 
For example, we could assume both that adjustment to a new equilibrium capital stock 
following a change in the real interest rate takes time rather than being instantaneous 
and that capital can be scrapped more quickly than it can be accumulated. By similar 
mechanisms to those analysed in the capital scrapping persistence literature cited and 
discussed in section 1.2.2.1, introducing these assumptions could generate the 
potential for persistence in unemployment following a rise in the real interest rate 
which is then reversed.  
 
Perhaps a more interesting alternative would be to assume, in the spirit of Keynes, that 
the investment rate (and hence the level of the aggregate capital stock) is influenced 
by the level of aggregate demand via its impact on current and hence expected future 
profitability. This then opens up  the possibility of very interesting hysteresis 
mechanism. Suppose that equilibrium employment is initially at its low level and there 
is a positive demand shock (it does not matter whether this shock is intentional or 
unintentional). In the standard imperfect competition framework, this will cause 
inflation to rise. This is unsustainable in the long-run and policies to reduce demand 
would presumably eventually be introduced. However, if higher demand induces 
greater investment, then the resulting increased aggregate capital stock may cause the 
equilibrium level of employment to rise. This effect could potentially address the 
problem of rising inflation, since employment would no longer be above its (new) 
equilibrium level. If so, the economy will be left in a new equilibrium with a higher 
level of both capital and employment. This hysteresis mechanism, which is clearly 
symmetric, illustrates how it might be possible for changes in demand to permanently 
affect equilibrium unemployment in our model.  
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Obviously, the idea presented above is merely a conjecture. Formal analysis of the 
problem would probably be quite complicated since we would need to consider the 
adjustment processes of both the capital stock and inflation. Nevertheless, using a 
similar framework, Sawyer (2002) has shown that it is definitely a theoretical 
possibility. Having said this, in the context of our model, it is probable that the above 
mechanism would only apply under certain circumstances. Firstly (for the positive 
hysteresis channel), the economy would probably need to have a very low capital 
stock to start with. Secondly, the capital stock would need to increase before inflation 
picked up significantly. This is probably more likely to happen during gradual demand 
expansions as these do not cause inflation to rise so quickly. Perhaps more critically, it 
is also probably more likely to occur if the expansion is export-led or investment-led. 
Indeed, with an investment-led expansion, the economy may get into a virtuous cycle, 
benefiting from  a two way linkage between investment and demand. By contrast, a 
consumption-led expansion is much more likely to run into high inflation (and, in an 
open economy, balance of payments problems) before extra capacity comes on stream. 
Finally, this mechanism is more likely to be successful if there are increasing returns 
to scale over some range. If this is the case, investment which increases the scale of 
operations may boost productivity through Verdoorn effects. This may help to lower 
the costs of firms, possibly reducing their incentive to raise prices following the 
demand expansion and hence reducing the possibility of inflation. 
 
6.3 Policy Implications 
 
The policy implications of our results are clear. They  are fairly similar to  those 
discussed by Rowthorn (1995, 1999). In particular,  to tackle unemployment, 
promoting investment may often be a superior alternative to pursuing labour market 
reforms. The case for this is made even stronger when we consider that high levels of 
investment are generally seen as beneficial to the economy as a whole, while some 
labour market reforms are associated with adverse effects on other aspects of welfare. 
 
There is much debate concerning how best to encourage investment (see, for example, 
the discussion in Bond and Jenkinson, 2000). However, possible policies include 
making the tax regime more favourable for investment, encouraging savings, and 
trying to encourage equity market investors to have longer time horizons (e.g. by  
  42 
reducing capital gains tax on long-term equity holdings). Meanwhile, if there is scope 
for positive hysteresis along the lines discussed  above, then gradual demand 
expansions (especially if they are export-led or investment-led) may also be an 
effective way of increasing investment. Finally, it has been argued (e.g. McKibbin and 
Vines, 2000) that increases in real interest rates were caused by the large fiscal deficits 
and restrictive monetary policy associated with both “Reaganomics” and German 
reunification. Since high real interest rates are bad for investment, this suggests that it 
might be beneficial for countries to pursue the reverse of this combination of policies: 
namely a reduction in fiscal deficits coupled with an expansionary monetary policy.
15 
Obviously, this is quite a sweeping statement which neglects both the probable 
desirability of expansionary fiscal policy during recessions and the fact that restrictive 
monetary policy may sometimes be necessary to counter inflation. Nevertheless, it 
sheds interesting light on the large tax cuts recently made by the Bush administration 
in the United States: the associated fiscal deficits could cause world real interest rates 
to rise, something which may possibly have adverse effects on equilibrium 
unemployment rates. It also suggests that the current hawkish attitude of the European 
Central Bank coupled with the rising fiscal deficits in many Eurozone countries may 
mean that the outlook for employment in parts of Europe is not particularly good.  
 
                                                 
15 Solow (2000) also proposes this policy mix for tackling unemployment in some European countries.  
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Appendix A 
 
We wish to show how (3.13) is derived. From (3.12): 
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Therefore, as required: 
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Relative Slopes of the Labour Demand Curves 
 
We wish to justify the relative slopes of the labour demand curves in Figure 2. These 
curves are sketched using the log version of (3.12) for the cases b = 0 and b > 0: 
 









=+-+-+-- Œœ - ºß
 
(B.1) 
Differentiating (B.1) with respect to wi and then inverting gives:  
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a =--   (B.2) 
Since a ', defined by 





=   (3.4) 
is less than one (recall that  01 ba £<<  and q > 1), both curves will be downward 
sloping. Moreover, substituting (3.4) into (B.2) gives:  











  (B.3) 
From  (B.3), we can clearly see that the b > 0 labour demand curve will be more 
steeply downward sloping than the b = 0 labour demand curve. This is as depicted in 
Figure 2. 
 
Intersection of the Labour Demand Curves 
 
We wish to show that the point of intersection (X) of the b = 0 and b > 0 labour 
demand curves will always occur at a level of employment below the threshold 
capacity constraint. We start by noting that the inverse labour demand curve is given 
by: 
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which may be rewritten as: 
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If b > 0, the inverse labour demand curve is simply (B.4). Meanwhile, when b = 0, the 
inverse labour demand curve is given by setting b = 0 in (B.4): 
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If we solve (B.4) and (B.5) as a pair of simultaneous equations, we will obtain the 
point of intersection of the b = 0 and b > 0 labour demand curves. Therefore, we set 
the right-hand sides of these two equations equal to each other. Doing this, cancelling 
several terms and simplifying gives:  
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  (B.6) 
In (B.6), 
X
i N  is the level of employment at the intersection of the two curves. Since 
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Derivations Associated with Section 3.3.1 
 
We  first wish to show how  (3.15) is derived. From the main text,  the first order 
condition is: 
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At interior solutions, log labour demand is given by (B.1) and real operating profits 
are given by (3.13). Taking logs of (3.13), we get: 
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From (C.1): 
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Now, using the chain rule: 
 
















Therefore, using (C.4) and (C.5), we can see that: 
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Substituting (C.4) into (C.6), we get: 
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We now return to the first order condition. Substituting  (C.2), (C.3) and (C.7) into 
(3.14), we get: 
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Rearranging to make the real wage the subject of (C.8) gives:  
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where: 
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  (3.16) 
which is what we have in the main text.  
 
We also wish to determine how the value of y depends on a ' and therefore on b. From 
the main text, we have:  
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Differentiating (3.16) with respect to a ' using the quotient rule gives: 
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Since g  and l are both constrained to lie between zero and one, this implies that:  







<   (C.9) 
Moreover, since q > 1, it is clear from (3.4) that: 







=-<   (C.10) 






>   (C.11) 
Therefore y depends positively on b. In other words, the higher the value of b, the 
higher the mark-up over the alternative wage. 
 
Derivations Associated with Section 3.3.2 
 







=  gives the same first order 
condition as above:  
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  (3.14) 
At the corner solution, employment is independent of the real wage and is given by 









=   (C.12) 
Real profits at the corner solution are given by (3.10): 
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( ) ( )
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X
  (3.10) 
Rearranging and taking logs: 















￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ Œœ P+=- ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ Œœ Łł ŁłŁł Łł Œœ ºß
X
  (C.13) 
Differentiating (C.13) with respect to ln Wi gives:  
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We use the substitutions in (C.4) to proceed: 
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 (C.14) 
Finally, as for the interior solutions: 
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  (C.7) 
We can now return to the first order condition. Substituting (C.12), (C.14) and (C.7) 
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Therefore, as required: 
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To show that both (3.31) and (3.32) are possible, we adapt Figure 4 by removing the 
example case (i) and case (ii) thresholds and adding on two more example case (iii) 
thresholds to obtain Figure 5 below: 
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Figure 5 
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(iii)  (iii)''  (iii)'  
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As discussed previously, with the original example case (iii) threshold, the choice is 
between (B) and (E). Now consider the two new example case (iii) thresholds: (iii)' 
and (iii)''. These are at the extremes of possible case (iii) thresholds: the threshold cannot 
be to the left of (iii)' because this would violate the fact, proved in Appendix B, that the 
threshold is always to the right of the intersection at (X); the threshold cannot be to the 
right of (iii)'' because we would then be in case (ii). As for all case (iii) thresholds, the 
choice at the start of period t is between the wage generating the feasible interior solution 
at (B) and the wage generating the relevant corner solution. For the (iii)' threshold, the 
corner solution is at (X). However, by a similar revealed preference argument to the one 
used in the main text for case (i) thresholds, we know that (B) must be preferred to (X). 
Therefore, in this situation, the interior solution will be chosen. Meanwhile, for the (iii)'' 
threshold, the relevant corner solution is at (K). In this situation, provided condition 
(3.27) is satisfied, (K) will be chosen. This follows directly from the argument in section 
3.3.2 where we showed that, given employment is at the threshold (which it must be if 
the threshold is (iii)''), the solution will be given by the intersection of the threshold and 
the b = 0 labour demand curve. Overall then, we can see that within case (iii), there exist 
some thresholds (e.g. (iii)') which generate the interior solution at (B) and other 
thresholds (e.g. (iii)'') which generate the arbitrary corner solution (E). Therefore, we can 
see that depending on the level of the exogenous capital stock, sometimes  (3.31) is 




We wish to show how (3.35) is derived. The relationships in (3.33) may be substituted 
into (3.11) to obtain: 
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X
  (E.1) 








  (E.2) 
while aggregating (2.3) gives: 




  (E.3)  
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  (E.4) 
which may be substituted into (E.1) to get: 
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Therefore, using (3.4): 
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  (E.5) 
Inverting (E.5) gives the aggregate labour demand curve at interior solutions for both 
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This is what we have in the main text.  
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(3.48) 
which is what we have in the main text.  
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